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THE DOCTRINE OF ULTRA VIRES IN UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT DECISIONS*
CLYDE L. CorSoN**
C. Tie Court's Reasons for its Strict Doctrine as to
Ultra Vires Contracts
Consider next what the Court in the Thomas case called the
"sound principle" underlying its doctrine of ultra vires con-
tracts. A good statement of this principle is found in the Central
Transportation Company case:
"All contracts made by a corporation beyond the scope of
those powers are unlawful and void, and no action can be
maintained upon them in the courts, and this upon three
distinct grounds: the obligation of every one contracting
with a corporation, to take notice of the legal limits of its
powers; 'the interest of the stockholders, not to be subjected
to risks which they have never undertaken; and, above all,
the interest of the public, that the corporation shall not tran-
scend the powers conferred upon it by law.' 30
(1) Notice of the corporation's lack of authority.
Although at one time most courts were imbued with the idea
that because the charter and applicable statutes are matters of
public record every person who deals with a corporation has notice
of the limits of its authority, fortunately at the present time this
notion is pretty well exploded in a majority of American juris-
dictions. And while some courts like the Supreme Court still
bring this idea to bolster up their decisions when no recovery is to
be allowed on the transaction in question, they completely disre-
gard it in thiose other and more numerous cases where the trans-
action is held valid.
Everyone should admit that under present business conditions
it is wholly futile to expect that a party to an ordinary trans-
action with a corporation will make an examination of its charter
and of the general statutes under which it was formed. Aside from
the fact that the volume of business done makes such examination
well-nigh a physical impossibility, there is the additional con-
* The first installment of this article appeared in the April, 1936, issue of
the WEST VmGINIA Lw QUARTERLY at p. 179.
**"Visiting Associate Professor of Law, West Virginia University; on leave
Lamar School of Law, Emory University.
13o 139 U. S. 24, 48, 11 S. Ct. 478 (1891).
1
Colson: The Doctrine of Ultra Vires in United States Supreme Court Decisi
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1936
THE DOCTRINE OF ULTRA VIRES
sideration that if the examination were made, only a lawyer would
be able to render a reliable opinion on the matter and even he
would often be at a loss in those cases where the law is unsettled.
It is not surprising that a legal requirement which is so imprac-
ticable and which, if enforced, would constitute such a check on
normal business intercourse should have been given up by most
courts.
Originally this requirement seems to have been tied in with
the notion that ultra vires transactions are illegal and that parties
to such transactions are chargeable with notice of their illegality.
However, with the realization that ultra vires transactions are not
necessarily illegal, this reason for constructive notice disappears.
Admittedly the case is different if the person dealing with
the corporation has or as a reasonable man should have actual no-
tice that the transaction is ultra vires. The corporation always has
or is chargeable with notice of its own lack of authority. When-
ever, then, both the parties to the contract know that it is ultra
vires, the law may well deny recovery both at law and in equity,
and this on the ground that there is no policy favoring the se-
curity of such transactions but that rather there is a policy against
them. Certainly, when in a weighing of the interests involved the
main one demanding that the transaction be upheld is lacking, the
interests of non-assenting stockholders and the policy of the state
against unauthorized corporate action may well be allowed to pre-
vail.
(2) The interests of non-assenting stockholders.
Since the doctrine of ultra vires as stated by the Supreme
Court is so strict that even if all the stockholders have assented,
the transaction is nevertheless void, the protection of the interests
of non-assenting stockholders must have been regarded by the
Court as merely an additional reason for holding the transaction
invalid. On the contrary, however, it would seem that this is the
strongest argument that can be made in favor of the doctrine, for
it is unquestionably true that those who furnish the capital must
be given the assistance of the law to see that their interests are
not endangered by uncontemplated and unauthorized corporate
action.
Consequently, if there were no other way to protect their
interests than by declaring all ultra vires transactions void, it
2
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would be arguable that such should be the rule. And while In
fact the application of this rule might as often work an impair-
ment of the stockholder's interests, which would be the case when
the party who was dealing with the corporation escapes liability,
as it works in favor of them when the corporation escapes, it may
nevertheless be true that in the long run the rule would operate as
a wholesome deterrent of such transactions and would thus be a
real protection to the non-assenting stockholder. But if he is suf-
ficiently cared for in other ways, there is certainly no reason why
the law should give him this additional protection, particularly
when to do so runs counter to the policy favoring the security of
business transactions.
Let us see then to what extent the interests of the non-assent-
ing stockholder are otherwise protected. To begin with, it is well
settled that a director or other officer is liable to the corporation
for any loss suffered through his causing it to engage in an ultra
vires transaction."' It is also well settled that in such case a stock-
holder may bring a derivative suit in equity to compel payment
to the corporation if it refuses or is unable to sue.132 Also, the dis-
senting stockholder in his individual capacity is allowed to enjoin
a threatened ultra vires act. 33 Although on principle it seems
extremely doubtful whether the injunction should be granted in
the intermediate case where an ultra vires contract has been made
but the corporation has not yet performed, the Supreme Court
has held that the injunction should issue.' And in accordance
with the majority rule in America that a purely executory ultra
vires contract is unenforceable, most states would probably allow
the injunction where neither party had performed. Also, where
as in the Supreme Court the contract remains unenforceable even
after performance on one side, the injunction would be granted.
But if the view is adopted than an executory ultra vires contract
is enforceable or if the contract has become valid by reason of per-
formance by the other party, it seems that the stockholder should
be limited to his right to bring a derivative suit to compel those
'3' Greenfield Say. Bank v. Abererombie, 211 Mass. 252, 97 N. E. 897
(1912). See also BA&.LINTINE, PRIVATE CORPOATION S (1927) § 117, at 367.
132 BALLATIN-E, id. §§ 188-195, at 616 and following.
133 Dodge v. Woolsey, 18 How. 331, 341, 15 L. Ed. 401 (1855); Ry. Co. v.
Allerton, 18 Wall 233, 21 L. Ed. 902 (1873).
134 Pearsall v. Gr. No. Ry., 161 U. S. 646, 16 S. Ct. 705 (1896).
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responsible for the unauthorized contract to repair any damage
done the corporation. " '
There is also the additional consideration that as a practical
matter these actions by stockholders are very often nuisance suits
only, which has led to restrictions by equity courts on the right to
bring such actions. It is clear that. a professional agitator will be
denied relief if it can be shown that his action is not bona fide.8 0
But such proof is necessarily difficult and this fact has led to the
restriction in some courts that the stockholder must have owned
his stock at the time of the injury complained of, which at least
prevents the purchase of the stock for the purpose of bringing
the suit.
That this practical consideration is part of the reason behind
this requirement in the federal courts is borne out by a statement
in Dimpfell v. Ohio R. R. Co. where the Supreme Court said:
"And it does not appear that the complainants owned
their shares when these transactions took place. For aught
we can see to the contrary, they may have purchased the
shares long afterwards, expressly to annoy and vex the com-
pany, in the hope that they might thereby extort, from its fears,
a larger benefit than the other stockholders have received or
may reasonably expect from the purchase, or compel the com-
pany to buy their shares at prices above the market value.
Unfortunately, litigation against large companies is often in-
stituted by individual stockholders from no higher motive."1 87
This case also brings out the proposition that as a further pro-
tection against this danger the stockholder's right to relief will
be barred unless he has been prompt and diligent in the exercise
of his right. It should be added that the additional danger that
derivative suits in the federal courts may be collusive in order to
confer jurisdiction on the ground of diversity of "citizenship has
led the Supreme Court to place still more rigid restrictions on the
stockholder's right to sue. 88
185 See Carpenter, Should the Doctrine of Ultra Fires be Discarded? (1923)
33 YALE L. T. 49, 65-66.
186 Gen. Inv. Co. v. Beth. Steel Corp., 88 N. J. Eq. 237, 102 Ati. 252 (1917).
187:110 U. S. 209, 210, 3 S. Ct. 573 (1884). See also Home Fire Ins. Co.
v. Barber, 67 Neb. 644, 656, 93 N. W. 1024 (1903), where Dean (then Com-
missioner) Pound said, "Sound reason and good authority sustain the rule
that a purchaser of stock cannot complain of the prior acts and management
of the corporation."
1s Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U. S. 450, 26 L. Ed. 827 (1881). This decision
led to the promulgation of former Equity Rule No. 94, present Equity Rule
No. 27.
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All these safeguards bear testimony to the fact that these
stockholder's suits are quite often not bona fide. If on the other
hand, however, the action is brought in good faith, equity has al-
ways been astute to protect the interests of the dissenting stock-
holders. It is believed that this protection is sufficient to care for
their legitimate complaints and that it is not necessary to give
them the additional protection derived from the rule that ultra
vires transactions are void. Here again it should be noted that
however strong this reason for the Court's doctrine may be, the
Court has never hesitated to subordinate the interests of non-
assenting stockholders to other interests when all things con-
sidered it was thought desirable to give validity to the ultra vires
action.
(3) The policy of the law that corporations should not tran-
scend their authority.
Although according to the Supreme Court the policy in favor
of keeping a corporation within the limits of its authority is the
interest which "above all" demands that ultra vires transactions
be held illegal and void, it is difficult to work up any enthusiasm
over this supposedly paramount interest. To be sure, such a policy
does exist, as witness the right of the state to forfeit the charter
of the corporation or oust it from the ultra vires business. But
when it is observed that in practice the state seldom takes such
action, it is a necessaary conclusion that this policy must not be so
strong after all.
The Supreme Court's emphasis on this point is nothing more
than a hangover from the early legal prejudice against corpora-
tions. There was a very real basis in fact for this jealousy at a
time when most of the corporations with which the law had to
deal were of a more or less monopolistic character and when
charters were obtainable only by royal grant. But today when a
new charter or an amendment to the old one conferring almost any
conceivable authority can be obtained merely by going through
the formality of filing certain papers with the proper state of-
ficial, such a jealous attitude is wholly unwarranted.
Although the Supreme Court has repeatedly referred to ultra
vires contracts as "unlawful" or "illegal" and therefore void, it
has constantly admitted that the policy against unauthorized cor-
porate action is not so strong as to make all transactions in con-
5
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travention of it illegal in the true sense. This admission has been
made in every case where the Court has given validity to the trans-
action either directly or indirectly. Whether the addition of the
policy against unauthorized transfers by public service companies
is enough to make the contract truly illegal is arguable, but even
there the Supreme Court has admitted that it is not by allowing
recovery in quasi-contracts.
It would seem then that none of the reasons assigned by the
Court for its strict doctrine is sufficient to support it. In most of
the cases where the doctrine has been applied the Court has failed
to give proper consideration to opposing interests, particularly the
interest in the security of business transactions. And it is believed
that when and if the Court makes a thoroughly conscious and con-
scientious weighing of the interests involved, it will be forced
to a recognition that not only is its doctrine unwarranted by the
reasons which have been given in justification of it, but that it is
also wholly unsuited to the actual conditions under which modern
corporations operate.
D. Cases in whicA the Court has Repudiated its Strict Doctrine
(1) The so-called "abuse of a power".
Reference has already been made to the fact that there were
two main lines of retreat used by the Court in its abandonment
of the extreme position which it first took in regard to ultra vires
contracts. One of these lines of retreat was the alleged distinction
between an abuse of authority and an entire lack of authority. To
be sure, the Court denies that this constitutes a repudiation of its
doctrine. However, a consideration of the cases where this dis-
tinction has been made will show that it is of very doubtful valid-
ity.
In Zabriskie v. Cleveland R. R. Co.,139 a stockholder brought
suit for an injunction against the payment of interest on the bonds
of another railroad which had been guaranteed by the defendant
corporation. The plaintiff also asked that upon a declaration that
the guaranty was void as beyond the authority of the corporation
a permanent injunction be issued against the use of any of its
assets for the redemption of the bonds. A statute of Ohio author-
ized railway componies,
139 23 How. 381, 16 L. Ed. 488 (1859).
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" '. ... by means of their subscription to the capital stock
of any other company, or otherwise, to aid such company in
the construction of its railroad, for the purpose of forming
a connection. . . . Provided, that no such aid shall be
furnished .... until a meeting of the stockholders .... shall
have been called .... and the holders of at least two-thirds
of the stock of such company represented at such meeting ....
shall have assented thereto.' -140
Admittedly this proviso had not been complied with. Although
a stockholders' meeting was called at which a resolution in favor of
the guaranty was adopted without a dissenting vote, more than
two-thirds of the stock represented was not voted.
In holding that the guaranty was intra vires the Court said:
"This principle does not impugn the doctrine that a corpo-
ration cannot vary from the object of its creation, and that
persons dealing with a company must take notice of what-
ever is contained in the law of their (sic) organization .....
But the principle includes those cases in which a corporation
acts within the range of its general authority, but fails to
comply with some formality or regulation which it should
not have neglected, but which it has chosen to disregard"''
The considerations which the Court felt to be controlling in this
case were well stated:
"These negotiable securities have been placed on sale in the
community, accompanied by these resolutions and votes, in-
viting public confidence. They have circulated without an
effort on the part of the corporation or corporators to restrain
them, or to disabuse those who were influenced by these ap-
parently official acts. Men have invested their money on the
assurance they have afforded.
"A corporation, quite as much as an individual, is held
to a careful adherence to truth in their (sic) dealings with
mankind, and cannot, by their representations or silence, in-
volve others in onerous engagements, and then defeat the
calculations and claims their own conduct had super-
induced."1 42
Of course, the result reached in this case is an eminently
sound one. Such criticism. of the decision as can be made must
be directed at the reasoning. To begin with, the justification which
the Court gives for its result really proves too much. It is quite
140 Id. at 396.
141 Id. at 398.
2421 Id. at 400-401.
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true that in such a case as this most of the force is taken out of
one of the grounds on which the Court bases its doctrine of ultra
vires, that everyone dealing with a corporation is charged with
notice of the provisions of its charter and of the applicable
statutes. For if upon an examination of them it is found that the
corporation has authority upon compliance with certain condi-
tions precedent, one may as a reasonable man presume that such
conditions have been met, particularly if the corporation repre-
sents that they have. Any other rule would be most unjust be-
cause whether the conditions have been complied with is a fact
peculiarly within the knowledge of the corporation and one which
the party dealing with the corporation has no means of ascer-
taining.
Without doubt a situation like this theoretically strengthens
the position of the party dealing with the corporation and weakens
one of the bases of the Court's doctrine. It was said that this is
only theoretically true because this line of reasoning presupposes
that an examination of the charter and the statutes has been made
which is certainly not so in a majority of cases. And if on the
other hand it is true that even in the case where the corporation
has no authority whatever this doctrine of constructive notice is
wholly impracticable under modern conditions, it is difficult to
see how the considerations of policy which influenced the Court in
this case are any more applicable to the one situation than to the
other. As a practical matter the position of the innocent bond-
holder would be just the same whether the corporation had no
authority at all or had authority upon condition, and the
"equities" of his position should appeal to the Court with equal
force in both cases. The Court's admission that the policy favor-
ing the security of business transactions demands that a corpora-
tion make good the reasonable expectations induced by its conduct
is enough to prove the injustice of its whole ultra vires doctrine.
What has been said thus far is a criticism not of this case but
of others in which the Court has failed to give effect to the policy
which was here recognized. The only real objection to the deci-
sion is that the Court denied that it was relaxing its rule as to
ultra vires contracts. In the principal case there was an express
provision that no guaranty should be made unless two-thirds of
the stock represented was voted in favor of such action. This is
clearly a grant of authority upon a condition precedent and it
8
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necessarily follows that until the condition is satisfied there is no
authority. This being true, and it would certainly seem to be
beyond question, it is difficult to see how the Court could say that
even though the condition precedent had not been met, the cor-
poration was nevertheless authorized to make the guaranty.
True, the Court was in a tight spot. Only the year before in
Pearce v. Madison R. R. Co.14 3 it had firmly established its doe-
trine that ultra vires contracts were void. Naturally, when pre-
sented with a case in which every instinct of justice demanded
that the corporation be held, the Court would try, if possible, to
reach that result without overruling its previous decision, and
that is exactly what vas done. It does not follow, however, that
it reached that result without encroaching upon the principle of
the former case. Although the Court may not have been in a posi-
tion to admit it at the time, certainly there is no reason why in
looking back over the cases as a whole it should not frankly be
recognized that in this case the Court really started a new line
of decisions in which validity was given to unauthorized corpor-
ate action.
The holding in this case has been consistently followed.144
In Louisville Ry. Co. v. Louisville Trust Co. ' the position of the
complaining stockholder was much more favorable than in the
Zabriskie ease where he had not acted with due diligence. In the
Louisville case a statute provided that the directors might upon
petition of a majority of the stockholders make a guaranty of the
bonds of another road. The directors made such a guaranty with-
out any petition and the stockholders repudiated this action at
their next meeting. Some of the bonds held by the Trust Com-
pany had been purchased in good faith and some with notice that
the guaranty was made without authority. The Court held that
the guaranty was valid as to those purchased in good faith and
void as to those taken with notice. But if the Court was correct
in the Zabriskie case in saying that the guaranty was intra vires,
query how notice would have anything to do with the rights of
the bondholders. It would seem rather that the Court is admitting
143 21 How. 441, 16 L. Ed. 184 (1858).
144 Handley v. Stutz, 139 U. S. 417, 424, 11 S. Ct. 530 (1891) ; St. Louis R.
R. Co. v. Terre Haute R. R. Co., 145 U. S. 393, 402-403, 12 S. Ct. 953 (1892) ;
Louisville R. R. Co. v. Louisville Tr. Co., 174 U. S. 552, 570-573, 19 S. Ct.
817 (1899); Scott v. Deweese, 181 U. S. 202, 21 S. Ct. 585 (1901).
145 174 U. S. 552, 19 S. Ct. 817 (1899).
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that the transaction was unauthorized and that as to one who has
notice of the want of authority the policy in favor of the security
of transactions is lacking.
Assuming the position to be sound that an act is truly ultra
vires when the conditions precedent upon which authority was
granted have not been complied with, it is interesting to note how
in this case the Court has disregarded the interests of non-assent-
ing stockholders and the interest of the state in preventing un-
authorized corporate action. These interests were subordinated to
the interest in the security of business transactions when the bonds
were purchased in good faith, and were given effect only when the
latter, interest was lacking due to the fact that the purchaser had
notice of the "abuse of authority". Here again it is seen that
the result reached by the Court has really been dictated by its
judgment as to the relative importance of the various interests
involved.
(2) Recovery in quasi-contracts.
The second main line of retreat from the Court's strict ultra
vires doctrine has been the granting of recovery in quasi-contracts
even though no recovery can be had on the contract itself.
An excellent example of this is found in Pullman Co. v. Cen-
tral Transportation Company.146 Before the Supreme Court ren-
dered its decision that the lease was void, the Transportation Com-
pany had filed several suits for installments of rent due under
the contract. In order to avoid further inconvenience the Pull-
man Company filed a bill for an injunction against the bringing
of successive suits, offering to pay the Transportation Company
any sums which might be found due up to the time that the Pull-
man Company elected to terminate the lease, which it claimed
the right to do under the terms of the contract. Before this suit
was concluded the Supreme Court handed down its decision that
the lease was void, whereupon the Pullman Company applied for
leave to dismiss its bill. This application was opposed by the
Transportation Company which also moved for leave to file a cross
bill for the recovery in quasi-contracts of the value of its prop-
erty under the lease.
The Transportation Company based its claim to relief on the
intimation contained in the closing paragraphs of the Supreme
Court's opinion in the former case where it was said:
146 171 U. S. 138, 18 S. Ct. 808 (1898).
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". ... the courts, while refusing to maintain any action
upon the unlawful contract, have always striven to do justice
between the parties, so far as could be done consistently with
adherence to law, by permitting property or money, parted
with on the faith of the unlawful contract, to be recovered
back, or compensation to be made for it .....
"Whether this plaintiff could maintain any action against
this defendant, in the nature of a quantum meruit, or other-
wise, independently of the contract, need not be considered,
because it is not presented by this record, and has not been
argued. "
The cross bill was allowed and on appeal to the Supreme
Court it was held that the Transportation Company was entitled
to the value of the property at the time of the alleged election by
the Pullman Company to terminate the lease, the Court taking
the position that the property was held with the consent of the
lessor so long as the rent was paid and that the implied promise
to return it or pay for it did not arise until the repudiation of the
lease by the lessee. Under this view it was held that the patents
and contracts, all of which had expired during the fifteen years
when the rent was paid, could not be taken into account and this
despite the fact that the contracts had been renewed and that
these contracts, as representing the "business" of the Transporta-
tion Company, were probably the main part of the consideration
for the rent under the lease. The result was that the Pullman
Company was made to account only for the rolling stock and other
tangible property which was valued at slightly over $700,000.
This sum was considerably less than the agreed rental for three
years, and the lease was supposed to run 99 years.
Except to note that this failed miserably to do full justice to
the Transportation Company and to note that similar result is
often reached when recovery is allowed only in quasi-contracts,
the measure of recovery will not be discussed further. Consider
rather the reasons which the Court gave for allowing any recovery
at all, and also whether the result reached really constitutes a
repudiation of the Court's strict doctrine. The Court itself in-
sisted that it was not:
...... in no way and through no channels, directly or indi-
rectly, will the courts allow an action to be maintained for the
recovery of property delivered under an illegal contract
147139 U. S. 24, 60-61, 11 S. Ot. 478 (1891).
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where, in order to maintain such recovery, it is necessary to
have recourse to that contract. The right of recovery must
rest upon a disaffirmance of the contract, and it is permitted
only because of the desire of courts to do justice as far as
possible to the party who has made payment or delivered
property under a void agreement, and which in justice he
ought to recover. But courts will not in such endeavor per-
mit any recovery which will weaken the rule founded upon
the principles of public policy already noticed.1 148
If the public policy is so strong as to demand that the con-
tract be held illegal and void in the first instance, then certainly
this policy is weakened by allowing any rights whatever to flow
from the "illegal" transaction. As was said by the New York
Court in Bath Gas Light Co. v. Clafy,
if the express contract was illegal in a proper
sense, and the parties to the lease were guilty of a public
wrong, so as to preclude a court of equity to entertain juris-
diction on the application of a lessor to be relieved from the
lease and to be restored to the possession of the leased prop-
erty, as was held in the case of The St. Louis .... Railroad
Co. v. Terre Haute & I. Railroad Co. (145 U. S. 393), then
surely it would be a mere evasion and would be inconsistent
with legal principles for the court to imply a contract from
the occupation under the illegal lease to relieve the wrongdoer
from the dilemma into which he had voluntarily placed him-
self."1714
The Supreme Court has itself recognized that there can be
no quasi-contractual recovery when the contract, in addition to
being ultra vires, is truly illegal or in contravention of some strong
public policy. In Awotin v. Atlas Exchange National Bank of
Chicago,"O A purchased bonds from the bank upon its agreement
at A's option to repurchase the bonds when they matured at par
with accrued interest. This agreement was in violation of an ex-
press statutory provision that national banks could engage in the
business of buying and selling securities only if the business was
conducted "without recourse".l5
Upon the bank's refusal to repurchase, A sought damages
for breach of contract or recovery of his purchase price on quasi-
contractual grounds. The Court, in holding that the contract
148 Supra n. 146, at 151-2.
149 151 N. Y. 24, 36, 45 W. E. 390 (1896).
150 295 U. S. 209, 55 S. Ct. 674 (1935).
151 Id. at 211.
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was ultra vires and void and that A was entitled to no relief, said:
"The invalidity of the contract was not due to the mere
absence of power in the bank to enter into it, in which ease
restitution, not inequitable to the bank or inimical to the pub-
lie interest, might be compelled ..... .National banks are
public institutions and the purpose and effect of the statute
is to protect their depositors and stockholders -and the public
from the hazards of contingent liabilities . . . . The prohibi-
tion would be nullified and the evil sought to be avoided would
persist, if, notwithstanding the illegality of the contract to
repurchase, the buyer, upon tender of the bonds, could re-
cover all that he had paid for them.'2 152
This line of reasoning should be compared with that in the
Central Transportation Company case where quasi-contractual
recovery was allowed. The result of such comparison is the con-
clusion that whenever the Court allows relief in quasi-contracts
it necessarily admits that neither the policy against ultra vires
contracts in general nor the policy against transfers by public
service corporations is so strong as to make the transaction truly
illegal. And this admission is certainly a repudiation of its doc-
trine that all ultra vires contracts are illegal and void.
It must be admitted that. the argument just made is open to
the objection that no account was taken of the fact that some of
the transactions considered so far have been executed and some
executory, and hence that even viewing them as truly illegal some
reconcilement of the decisions can be made. This was purposely
left out of account because it is clear that the Supreme Court rule
allowing recovery in quasi-contracts is not based on the idea that
so long as an illegal contract remains executory, the policy against
such illegal action is furthered by allowing a recovery.1'2 That
this is true becomes apparent from a consideration of other cases
in which the rule has been applied.
In Aldrich v. National Bank54 it was held that even though
the bank had no authority to borrow money, it was liable in an
152 Id. at 214. Accord, Kimen v. Atlas Exchange National Bank of Chicago,
295 U. S. 215, 55 S. Ct. 677 (1935) (companion case); Texas & Pae. Ry. Co.
v. Pottorff, 291 U. S. 245, 54 S. Ct. 416 (1934); City of Marion, Ill. v.
Sneeden, 291 U. S. 2622 54 S. Ct. 421 (1934). See also Harriman v. North-
ern Securities Co., 197 U. S. 244, 295, 25 S. Ct. 493 (1905), where it was held
that property could not be recovered when it had been transferred under
a contract void as against public policy because in restraint of trade.
ir. See Spring Co. v. Knowlton, 103 U. S. 49, 58, 26 L. Ed. 400 (1880).
14 176 U. S. 618, 20 S. Ct. 498 (1900).
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action for money had and received to the extent of any sum actual-
ly used by it. The Court speaks of "common honesty" and of
"equity and good conscience", and refers to the fact that there is
nothing in the Acts of Congress which would authorize a national
bank to use money or property of another for its benefit without
liability for so doing. Again in Citizens' National Bank v. Ap-
pleton 1 5 the Court says that "The law would be very impotent
to do justice if it could not . . . . without violating established
legal principles" allow recovery of property received under an
ultra vires contract. In that case A was indebted to the national
bank to the extent of $10,000. It was arranged between A and the
national bank that A should borrow $12,000 from another bank
which loan the national bank was to guarantee, and that A should
give the national bank $10,000 of the amount so obtained. The
making of such a guaranty was ultra vires but the bank was held
upon an implied promise to repay the $10,000 actually received
by it.
It is apparent from these cases that the basis for the rule is
broadly the equitable principle that one person should not be un-
justly enriched at the expense of another, or more particularly
the principle that whenever one person has received property from
another which in good conscience he is not entitled to keep, the
law will imply a promise to return it or its equivalent. If there
is any policy which compels the Court to deny recovery on an
ultra vires contract to repay money, that policy is certainly de-
feated when the Court turns right around and allows the money
to be recovered on the basis of an implied contract. Of course the
corporation should be made to pay, but the Court should recognize
that in allowing recovery it is cutting the ground out from under
its doctrine that ultra vires contracts are illegal and void. No
amount of talk about reaching this result "without violating es-
tablished legal principles" and about no recovery being allowed
on the contract but only in disaffirmance of it can get around the
fact that in reality the Court is giving validity to an ultra vires
transaction. It has been constrained to do this because the injus-
tice of the situation created by the application of its rule that
ultra vires contracts are void was simply too much for the Court
to stand.
15 216 U. S. 196, 202, 30 S. Ct. 364 (1910); and cf. Rankin v. Emigh, 218
U. S. 27, 30 S. Ct. 672 (1910).
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That the Court itself realizes that in allowing recovery on an
implied contract it has really been doing indirectly what it refused
to do directly is quite apparent from a later decision. In Na-
tional Bank v. Mott Iron Works'56 the situation was strikingly
similar to that in the Appleton case. A obtained a sub-contract
for the plumbing in a hospital being built by B who agreed to
pay monthly 85% of the value of the labor and materials furnished
by A, the balance to be paid upon the completion of the work.
A assigned this contract to the defendant bank as security for
advances made to him. A later ordered supplies from the plain-
tiff who refused to ship them without some security. Thereupon,
in order to enable A to complete his contract so that he could re-
pay the advances, the bank executed a written guaranty to the
plaintiff for the payment by A of a bill for over $2300. Subse-
quently the bank received $1100 under the assigned contract and
would have received much more except for the fact that it allowed
B to pay more than $5400 directly to A. As a result of this A
still owed the bank a balance after he had been credited with the
$1100 actually received. Under these circumstances the plaintiff
sued the bank on its written guaranty and recovered judgment for
the full amount in a state court. This recovery on the contract
was affirmed by the Supreme Court.
In a very short opinion by Justice Holmes the Court said:
"Therefore the bank is in the position of having realized
the benefit to acquire which the guaranty was made, and of
having realized it out of the proceeds of the goods that it in-
duced the Iron Company to sell.
"In such circumstances, whether the contract is valid
or not, the contractor is accountable to the contractee, up to
the amount of his undertaking, for the proceeds coming to his
hands from the contractee upon the inducement of the con-
tract. Citizens' Central National Bank v. Appleton, 216 U.
S. 196. In this case therefore the plaintiff is entitled to re-
cover the amount for which it has declared, and as the case
was fully tried upon the merits, the distinction between a
recovery on the guaranty, as having been necessarily incident
to the business of banking, and a recovery of the amount re-
ceived by petitioner on account of the guaranty, becomes
purely formal.' "I
:o 258 U. S. 240, 42 S. Ct. 286 (1922).
n7M I. at 241.
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It is to be regretted that the Court interpolated the comment
about the guaranty being necessarily incident to the business of
the bank, which might allow it later to distinguish this case on
the ground that the guaranty was after all intra vires. However,
it is seriously to be questioned whether the Court meant to in-
timate that such a guaranty by a national bank was intra vires.
For this would be to overrule the holding in the Appleton case
that a similar guaranty was unauthorized. In both cases the bank
in order to collect a debt owing to it guaranteed the performance
of a contract from the proceeds of which it hoped to realize the
sum due it, and in the Appleton case it was taken for granted that
such a guaranty by a national bank was ultra vires. This case
will be considered, then, on the assumption that the guaranty here
was also ultra vires.
To begin with, the Court admits that whether the contract is
valid or not there is no substantial difference between a recovery
on the guaranty and a recovery on an implied contract, which of
course presupposes that the contract price was the same as the
reasonable value of the goods. This is a clear recognition that in
the application of its rule as to recovery in quasi-contracts the
Court has been doing indirectly what it has refused to do directly,
and that such a formal distinction as it had been making in the
past would not warrant the reversal of a case which had been
fairly tried on its merits. In view of the customary language of
the Court in its former decisions the admission of such an evident
fact is indeed surprising.
In the second place, although the Court purported to be ap-
plying the principle of the Appleton case in finding that the plain-
tiff was entitled to recover in quasi-contracts the full amount of
the guaranty, it would seem that this case is really an extension
of that principle. In the Appleton case the bank was held liable
only for the $10,000 which actually came into its hands, although
the plaintiff had paid out $12,000 on the faith of the guaranty.
But in the instant case although the bank actually received only
$1100 as proceeds of the contract assigned by the plaintiff, it was
held liable for $2300, the full amount of the guaranty. True, the
bank could under the assigned contract have received more than
enough to cover the guaranty, but allowed the money to be paid
directly to A. If the view be taken that such payments to A with
the assent of the bank are to be regarded as in legal effect pay-
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ments to the bank itself, which would certainly be true if the suit
were by the bank to recover on the assigned contract, then it may
be admitted that the case is no extension of the former principle
except in so far as the reasonable value of the goods may have
been less than the contract price, on which point there is no evi-
dence either way. Though it was not made clear, it may well be
that this is all the Court meant for it referred several times to the
proceeds of the plaintiff's property whidh came into the hands
of the bank But however that may be, even if without any ex-
tension of the principle of the Appleton case the amount of re-
covery in quasi-contracts is properly the same as the sum recover-
able on the guaranty, the fact remains that since here the Court
recognized that there is only a formal difference between these
methods of recovery, this case marks a substantial retreat from the
Court's former position.
In the application of their strict doctrine, the English courts
have been more logically consistent than the Supreme Court. They
have recognized that to allow recovery in quasi-contracts is to
defeat the policy which they feel demands that ultra vires con-
tract be held void, and have consequently denied recovery in such
case. The only relaxation of this rule has been in those cases
where the ultra vires creditor could trace his money or property
into assets remaining in the hands of the corporation. Further,
if the creditor can prove that his money or property has been
used to pay off intra vires obligations of the company. thus not
increasing its indebtedness, he is allowed recovery on the theory
that by tracing his property into the hands of the other creditor
he is thereby subrogated to the claim which that creditor had
against the company.
A leading English decision dealing with this problem is Sin-
clair v. Brougham. 8  In that case, a company formed to operate
as a building society went into the general banking business which
was of course ultra vires. If the shareholders did not consent to
this ultra vires undertaking in advance, they at least ratified it
in so far as this was possible by their failure to raise any objection
after learning all the facts. This unauthorized business became
so large that the company had on deposit more than ten million
pounds. Upon the liquidation of the company the question was
the priority between creditors on intra vires transactions, the de-
" 18 (1914) A. C. 398.
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positors and the shareholders. It was held that the intra vires
creditors should be paid in full and that the balance should be
divided pro rata between the shareholders and the depositors, ex-
cept in so far as some-depositors might be allowed a preference
on the theory of subrogation outlined above. The Court denied
that there was any quasi-contractual obligation on the part of the
company to repay the money given it by the depositors. The re-
sult was that the shareholders, who in effect had invited the de-
posits, were unjustly enriched at the expense of the depositors.
In the course of his opinion, Lord Haldane said:
"To hold that a remedy will lie in personam against a
statutory society, which by hypothesis cannot in the case in
question have become a debtor or entered into any contract
for repayment, is to strike at the root of the doctrine of
ultra vires as established in the jurisprudence of this country.
That doctrine belongs to substantive law and is the outcome
of statute, and cannot be made different by any choice of form
in procedure.
"It is, therefore, binding both at law in equity.' " 5
This is indeed logically consistent and serves to bring more sharp-
ly into relief the inherent injustice of the whole line of reasoning
underlying the strict ultra vires doctrine.
Despite this logical consistency in result, the statement that
since a promise in fact would have been void there can therefore
be no valid implied promise,1 0 overlooks the circumstance that
the promise in quasi-contractual recovery is one implied in law
and not one implied in fact. True enough, the implication in law
of a promise to repay would be logically inconsistent with the
conception based on the Fiction Theory that a corporation is
legally incapable of incurring any obligation in connection with
an unauthorized transaction. But to imply the promise in this
case and thus to confer legal capacity on the corporatioi, at least
to this extent, is no more illogical than to confer legal capacity in
the case of a tort under cover of the doctrine of respondeat su-
perior, which the English courts have long since done.
Turning again to the Supreme Court decisions, it would seem
to be evident that the granting of recovery in quasi-contracts is,
so far as it goes, a repudiation of the Court's strict doctrine of
1'9 Id. at 414.
,so Id. at 417, 433, 440.
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ultra vires and is hence a step in the right direction. But as has
already been pointed out, the result reached when recovery is
limited to quasi-contracts is often unfair to the plaintiff whether
he be the one who dealt with the corporation or the corporation
itself. This is true because he normally loses the benefit of his
bargain which the policy favoring the security of transactions
demands that he receive. Since the Court by granting quasi-
contractual has already come so near to enforcing the ultra vires
contract, and has thus admitted the weakness of the reasons for
its strict rule, it ought now to go the whole way and declare such
a contract valid unless there is some policy involved which can
be adequately protected only by holding the contract void or un-
less there are circumstances present by reason of which the policy
in favor of the security of business transactions is lacking. This
would certainly come nearer to doing justice as between the par-
ties, which after all should be the goal of the law in every case.
E. The Treatment of Purely Executory Contracts - Specific
Performance
In treating all ultra vires contracts as void the Supreme Court
has not made the distinctions normally taken in the state courts
between contracts wholly executed, those executed on one side, and
those wholly executory. However, the results reached are much
the same as if the distinctions had been made.
When the contract has been wholly executed the transaction
is not subject to collateral attack, in a majority of state courts on
the ground that such performance validates the contract, and in
the Supreme Court on the ground that the law will leave the
parties to an illegal transaction where it finds them. When the
contract has been executed on one side only the general rule in
the state courts is that recovery will be allowed because such per-
formance makes the contract valid, and the Supreme Court al-
lows recovery in such case in quasi-contracts. However, although
it comes within the principle of the Appleton case, query whether
the Supreme Court would allow recovery where the defendant
has received no actual property which he should return to the
.plaintiff but where he has received valuable services. While the
Supreme Court has not passed on this point, a lower federal court
has held that in order to prevent unjust enrichment recovery
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would be allowed in such case.16 When the contract is wholly
executory the majority rule in the state courts is in accord with
the Supreme Court rule that no recovery will be allowed. And
it is probably the universal rule that no specific performance can
be had of a wholly executory ultra vires contract.'0 2
Before taking up the Supreme Court cases in which the mat-
ter of specific performance was involved, consider the single case
found in which a state court without the aid of a statute has held
that a wholly executory ultra vires contract was valid and enforce-
able. In Harris v. Independence Gas Co.103 the owners of land
Lad made a lease of the gas and oil rights to a corporation. Sub-
sequently the owners purported to convey the oil rights to the
plaintiff who then brought an action against the corporation to
cancel that part of the lease relating to those rights on the ground
that the corporation was not authorized to engage in the oil busi-
ness. The Kansas court, treating the lease as an executory con-
tract, denied this relief saying that it was "convinced of the
soundness of the view that in the absence of special circumstances
affecting the matter neither party to even an executory contract
should be allowed to defeat its enforcement by the plea of ultra
vires. The doctrine is logical in theory, simple in application, and
just in result."164
In the course of the opinion it was said that while it is inac-
curate to base the majority rule as to the enforceability of ultra
vires contracts executed on one side on the ground of estoppel,
such use of the term estoppel is not misleading. However, it is
likely to be misleading and it is certainly more conducive to clear
thinking to place the rule squarely on the ground of "public
policy" as was done in this case, provided that the policy involved
be clearly defined.
It was next said that the problem of ultra vires action by a
de jure corporation, where the question is whether the corporation
has authority to enter into the particular transaction in dispute,
can be assimilated to the problem of de facto corporations where
the question is whether the corporation has authority to enter into
any transactions whatever. It was pointed out that the rule in
both cases is based not upon the ground of estoppel but upon
101 Quicksilver Min. Co. v. Anderson, 245 Fed. 67 (1917).
162 See 7 FLETCHER, CYC. OF CORP. § 3462.
10e 76 Kans. 750, 92 Pac. 1123 (1907).
164 Id. at 763.
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grounds of public policy. Although the intimation was made that
completeness and logical symmetry would seem to require that any
legal system which allows recovery on a partly executed ultra
vires contract should also allow recovery on a purely executory
contract, it was later said that the view that this question of per-
formance was important is not unreasonable, there being at least
a difference in degree in the merit of the claims made in the two
cases.
These observations of the Kansas court raise some interesting
questions. Consider for a moment the practice of making estoppel
the basis of the majority state rule which allows recovery on con-
tracts executed on one side, and inquire whether this rule is con-
sistent with a refusal to allow recovery on a wholly executory
contract.
As for the matter of estoppel, it is indeed possible to work
out an estoppel against a corporation when it represents that it
has authority to enter into a contract and the other party per-
forms his side of it in reliance upon this representation. But
even here the estoppel argument fails if the doctrine of constructive
notice be applied, because then there could be no reasonable re-
liance. But when the other side of the picture is looked at, it is
clear that the party who deals with the corporation makes no
representation upon which the corporation can reasonably rely
to its damage, the corporation being always chargeable with
notice of its own lack of authority. At best all that can be said
in favor of the corporation is that the other party has impliedly
promised not to plead ultra vires. But no effort has been made
to place the decisions on the ground of promissory estoppel and
it is clear that all the courts which have allowed the corporation
to recover in such ease have not yet accepted that doctrine. And
even if estoppel would satisfactorily explain the rule, query
whether the measure of damages should be the contract price or
only the reasonable value of the plaintiff's performance. It would
seem that on the theory of estoppel it should properly be the lat-
ter which is really the extent to which the plaintiff has been dam-
aged by his reliance on the representation made.
It follows then that to justify any recovery by the corporation
and certainly to justify its recovery of the contract price some
explanation other than estoppel must be given. A satisfactory ex-
planation can be found only in the principle that the policy favor-
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ing the security of transactions requires that one who has entered
into a transaction make good the reasonable expectations induced
by his conduct unless such a result would operate to defeat some
countervailing policy of paramount importance. It has already
been shown that no such policy exists in the case of a contract
which is simply ultra vires.
In respect to the distinction generally made between partially
executed and wholly executory contracts, it seems evident that re-
gardless of the ground on which recovery is allowed when the con-
tract has been executed qn one side, the result is logically incon-
sistent with a denial of recovery when the contract is wholly
executory. In the first place, the merit of the majority state rule
as to contracts executed on one side over the rule allowing re-
covery only in quasi-contracts is that the majority rule gives the
plaintiff the benefit of his bargain. It is indeed true that at first
blush the position of one who has given the defendant the per-
formance called for by the contract would seem to appeal more
strongly to the court than the position of one who has furnished'
nothing and has merely an expectation of a profit. But when
it -is realized that this difference in position is equalized by the
allowance of recovery in quasi-contracts, it at once becomes ap-
parent that no justification cin be made for giving the plain-
tiff the benefit of his bargain in the one situation that does not
apply with equal force to the other. And when it is further real-
ized that the proper and only satisfactory explanation of recovery
on the contract is any case is the policy favoring the security of
transactions, it necessarily follows that the rule as to executory
contracts should logically be the same as the rule regarding con-
tracts executed on one side.
This being so obviously true, and the rule allowing recovery
on. a purely executory ultra vires contract being in the language
of the court -in the Harris case so "logical in theory, simple in
application and just in result", it is indeed surprising that no
courts without the aid of a statute have followed the decision in
that case in the twenty-seven years since it was handed down.
Returning now to the Supreme Court cases, consider those
in which the matter of specific performance was involved. In
Pennsylvania R. R. Co. v. St. Louis R. R. Co.105 the lessor brought
suit for the specific performance of a lease. The Court took the
165 118 U. S. 290, 6 S. Ct. 1094 (1886).
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position that under the circumstances the bill would be granted if
the contract was intra vires, but upon a consideration of the corpo-
ration's authority found that the contract was ultra vires and
hence that no relief could be given. And so, although this is a
direct holding that the Supreme Court will not grant specific per-
formance of an ultra vires contract, it is unsatisfactory for present
purposes in that it fails to discuss the peculiar questions incident
to the problem of the specific performance of such a contract,
which questions can arise only when the transaction is valid at law.
However, in Case v. Kelly "I which involved an ultra vires
acquisition of property the Court made its position on this matter
clear though the question of specific performance was not directly
involved. In that case donors of land to a railroad corporation
conveyed it to individual officers of the company upon a secret
trust for it, the corporation already having all the land it was
authorized to own. In an action by the receiver of the corporation
to have the trust declared and to compel a conveyance of the
property to the corporation, it was alleged that the officers acted
fraudulently in taking conveyance to themselves when they should
have had the land conveyed directly to the corporation. But the
Court denied any relief, saying that:
"..... while a court might hesitate to declare the title to
lands received already, and in the possession and ownership
of the company, void on the principle that they had no author-
ity to take such lands, it is very clear that it will not make
itself the active agent in behalf of the company in violating
the law and enabling the company to do that which the law
forbids. "11
This is essentially the same as the argument generally made
in denying specific performance of an ultra vires contract - that
a court of equity will not affirmatively assist a corporation to
do an unauthorized act. Two reasons are usually assigned as the
basis for this argument. One is that the granting of specific per-
formance would defeat the policy of the law against unauthorized
corporate action. But when it is remembered that the problem of
specific performance cannot properly arise unless the contract is
enforceable at law, it becomes apparent that this argument of
policy is answered by the fact that the policy will be defeated
,o 133 U. S. 21, 10 S. Ct. 216 (1890).
167 Id. at 28. For a dictum to the same effect, see U. S. v. No. Pac. R. R.
Co., 152 U. S. 284, 300, 14 S. Ct. 598 (1894).
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in any event by the recovery at law of damages for breach of the
contract. 'Thus, in so far as this question of policy is concerned, it
seems that logically a court of equity should grant specific per-
formance in any case where the contract would be enforceable at
law, provided of course the remedy at law is inadequate. And this
result has been reached by some courts both in actions by the
corporation and in actions by the other party in cases where the
contract had been partly performed. s18
The other reason given for the refusal to grant specific per-
formance is that it would be futile to do so because the state could
at once declare the charter forfeited or oust the corporation from
the ultra vires business. As a practical matter this is answered
by the fact that the state seldom takes any action against the cor-
poration. But it must be admitted that there is a residuum of
force in this argument of futility because there is always a chance,
however remote it may be, that the state will proceed against the
corporation in quo warranto, and this bare possibility may be
enough to warrant a denial of specific performance when the con-
tract is wholly executory. But it must be kept in mind that the
admission that conceivably the refusal of specific performance
may be justified in some cases is not an admission that the plain-
tiff is entitled to no relief. On the contrary, as was mentioned
above the problem of specific performance does not properly arise
unless the case is one in which there is a remedy at law.
That only injustice can result from a denial of any relief
whatever has already been argued and is brought out pointedly
in Case v. Kelly, the Supreme Court decision under consideration.
Although the question of the specific performance of a contract
was not directly involved, the situation was very analogous. Ad-
mitting for the moment that the Supreme Court was justified in
refusing to compel the officers to convey the land to the corpora-
tion, its refusal to declare them constructive trustees of the land
and to make them account for its value is indefensible. The re-
sult was that while the creditors of the corporation were denied
this means of collecting their claims, the fraudulent fiduciaries
were left in possession of property to which in good conscience
they were not entitled. While the Court intimates that possibly
18 Coleridge Creamery Co. v. Jenldns, 66 Neb. 129, 92 N. W. 123 (1902)
(action by corporation - decision rendered by Pound); Dorsett v. Traction
Co., 30 S. D. 420, 138 N. W. 808 (1912) (action by other party).
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the donors of the land might object, it says very clearly that
neither the corporation nor the receiver could complain.
It is true that the corporation had not furnished any con-
sideration for the land other than the building of its road. But
the statement that a court of equity will not affirmatively assist
a corporation by declaring a trust of lands which it was not
authorized to take is broad enough to deny relief even if the cor-
poration had paid for the land. This refusal at least to compel an
accounting merely illustrates the injustice inherent in the Court's
strict doctrine.
With that case compare Schtuyler National Bank v. Gadsden'6 9
where in order to avoid the prohibition against the taking of real
estate security by a national bank, the mortgage was made to an
officer of the bank in trust for it. Although the matter was only
incidental, all parties admitting that the bank could have the
benefit of the security, the Court said that "the taking of real
estate security by the president of the bank in his individual name,
for the benefit of the bank, was in legal dffect but the taking of
security by the bank itself.' 7 0 This is sound enough but it is
difficult to see why in the other case the conveyance of land to the
officers in trust for the corporation was not also in legal effect
a conveyance to the corporation.
True, the cases can be distinguished on the ground that in
the bank case the Court was merely applying the well established
equitable principle that the security follows the debt, that no mat-
ter to whom the mortgage was given, if it was intended to secure
a certain debt, the owner of that debt can have the benefit of the
security. But in the other case if the Court had applied the equal-
ly well established equitable principle that a fraudulent fiduciary
must be compelled to account to his beneficiary, the result would
have been a recognition of the equitable title of the corporation.
This would have been enough to bring the case within the general
rule that an ultra vires acquisition of property can be questioned
only by the state, for surely that rule is not limited to the acqui-
sition of legal title alone.
In a situation like that in Case v. Kelly neither the donors of
the land nor the fraudulent officers as grantees should be allowed
to take advantage of the fortuitous circumstance that the convey-
,00 191 U. S. 451, 24 S. Ct. 129 (1903).
1o Id. at 458.
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ance was not made directly to the corporation, in which case the
transaction would admittedly have been open to no collateral at-
tack. The injustice of the Court's refusal to declare the trust in
this case is accentuated by the fact that under the circumstances
the real beneficiaries would have been the creditors of the corpo-
ration and not the corporation itself. It is evident that the Court
here failed to make a proper evaluation of the interests involved.
It is realized that to urge the adoption of the view that an
executory ultra vires contract is valid and in addition to urge
that specific performance of such a contract be granted whenever
the remedy at law is inadequate, is to get considerably ahead of
the game. But when the state and federal cases are viewed as a
whole, beginning with those which hold that a corporation can do
nothing which was unauthorized and hence is not even liable for
torts or crimes, aiid coming on down to the Harris case and to
those few cases where speiifie performance was granted, it be-
comes evident that in the development of our law as to ultra Vires
transactions there has been a definite and sustained trend toward
the view urged. And it is believed that the matter will be handled
satisfactorily only when the courts go all the way and hold such
transactions subject only to direct attack by the state unless in a
given case there is some policy involved which outweighs the policy
in favor of the security of transactions or unless this latter policy
is lacking due to the fact that the party dealing with the corpor-
ation has actual notice of the want of authority.
VI. MISCMAANEous CASES
There remains for consideration a varied assortment of cases
which could not without inconvenience have been taken up under
the groupings so far made.
A. Ultra Vires By-Laws
In National Bank v. Insurance Company'1 ' the charter of
the bank expressly authorized the directors to make a by-law
prohibiting the transfer of stock owned by any stockholder who
was indebted to the bank unless such transfer was made with the
consent of the directors. In pursuance of this authority such a by-
law was passed in which it was declared that the bank should
have a lien on the stock for any sum owing by the stockholder and
71' 193 U. S. 581, 24 S. Ct. 524 (1904).
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this by-law was copied in and made a condition of the stock certi-
ficates. Under these circumstances the bank advanced money to
one of its stockholders, it being mentioned at the time that the
stock was to be part of the security but no pledge of the certificate
being made. Subsequently the stockholder pledged the certificate
with the insurance company as collateral. Upon default on the
second loan the stock was sold at auction and was purchased by
the insurance company which then demanded that the bank trans-
fer the stock on the books. The bank refused to do this on the
basis of its by-laws of which the insurance company had notice
by reason of the condition in the stock certificate. In an action
to compel the bank to make the transfer the Supreme Court held
that despite the express authority in the charter such a by-law
was void because it was ultra vires and also against the policy
in favor of the free alienation of property.
The correctness of this holding becomes apparent upon a con-
sideration of these additional facts. The bank had been organized
under the Banking Act of 1864 which had expressly repealed the
Act of 1863. The Act of 1863 had itself prohibited transfers by
stockholders who were indebted to the bank. Since this provision
was left out of the Act of 1864 there is an implied prohibition
against any further restrictions on alienation and hence a prohi-
bition against the making of such a by-law as the one in question.
And since any part of a charter which is in conflict with a pro-
vision of the statute under which the corporation was formed is
void, the by-law was therefore unauthorized and invalid. The
Court found in the express repeal of the former provision a legis-
lative policy favoring the free alienability of stock in national
banks,' 72 which is really but a part of the larger policy of the law
favoring the free alienability of property in general.
Of course, the decision in this case is eminently sound. Cer-
tainly a corporation cannot claim authority under provisions in its
charter which are in conflict with either the letter or the spirit of
the statute under which it was organized, particularly when such
charter provisions may so easily be overlooked by the official
whose business it is to record the incorporation papers. There
being no special interest favoring the validity of ultra vires by-
laws, they are generally held void. 7'
172 See also Bank v. Lanier, 11 Wall. 369, 20 L. Ed. 172 (1870); Bullard
v. Bank, 18 Wall. 589, 21 L. Ed. 923 (1873).
173 BALLANTmE, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 178, at 596-601.
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B. The Compromise of an Ultra Vires Transaction
In Market Company v. Kelly"'7 a corporation chartered for
only twenty years built a market house on land owned by it in
fee and made a 99-year lease of one of the stalls to the defendant.
The defendant in part payment for this lease gave the corporation
twenty notes payable over a period of years. Subsequently in com-
promise of the transaction the defendant gave the corporation
another note for a sum smaller than the total of the original notes.
The compromise note remaining unpaid at maturity, the corpo-
ration brought suit upon it. The defendant claimed that both the
original transaction and the compromise were void on the ground
that since the corporation was chartered for only twenty years it
did not have the authority to make a lease for a longer period,
to which the plaintiff replied that a corporation regardless of the
time for which it was chartered could hold and transfer a fee and
consequently could make a valid conveyance of any estate less than
a fee. This argument of the plaintiff was unquestionably valid
and was enough to dispose of the case, but the Court refused to
pass on that point and placed its decision on the validity of the
compromise, saying that even "If the plaintiff had exceeded its
corporate powers in making the original contract, yet it had
authority to compromise *and settle all claims by or against it
under that contract ..... The compromise of the disputed claim
on the original notes was a legal and sufficient consideration for
the new note. "175
Although only one more Supreme Court case was found in-
volving the matter of the compromise of an ultra vires transac-
tion, 7 6 the decision that such a compromise is valid is sound
enough and is simply another method by which the Court gets
around its strict doctrine. For it should be noted that the result
reached is but another way of saying than an ultra vires contract
is not truly illegal. It is probably the universal rule that a com-
promise of an illegal transaction is open to the same objections
that could have been directed at the original transaction. 7 Con-
sequently, to hold that whatever policy exists against ultra vires
contracts can be defeated by a compromise is to admit that the
'74 113 U. S. 199, 5 S. Ct. 422 (1885).
175 Id. at 202.
17 Gas Co. v. Berry, 113 U. S. 322, 5 S. Ct. 525 (1885) (compromise hold
valid, but query whether the transaction was ultra vires in the proper sense).
177 3 WUISTON, CONuACTS (1931) § 1784 and cases there cited.
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policy is decidedly weak. Further, it is interesting to note that
no account was here taken of the interests of the stockholders or
of the rule about constructive notice. So this case must be added
to the already long list of cases in which the Court has swung
away from its doctrine that ultra vires contracts are illegal and
void.
C. Who may Question an Ultra Vires Transaction
It is of course true that the state which chartered the cor-
poration may proceed against it for usurpation of authority and
even if the state did not grant the charter, it may question the
corpoikation's authority to transact business within the state78
except in so far as this power may be subject to constitutional
limitations. And under proper circumstances a non-assenting
stockholder may raise the point. Further and unfortunately the
Supreme Court allows both the corporation and the other party
to take advantage of the lack of authority in many cases, particu-
larly those dealing with ultra vires contracts.
On the other hand, however, in Railroad Co. v. Ellerman'7 9
the court held that the authority of the corporation could not be
questioned by a third party who had not dealt with the corporation
in connection with the ultra vires business even though he may
have been injured by the competition afforded by that business.
The Court said that if he could not have complained of the same
competition on the part of an individual, he may not complain
merely on the ground that the business was beyond the authbrity
of the corporation, which question can be raised only by an inter-
ested party. The result here reached is in accord with the rule
generally followed that a stranger may not collaterally attack an
ultra vires transaction unless it is expressly so provided by
statute.180
D. Application of State Law by Federal Courts
The question whether the federal courts are bound to apply
state law is quite a problem in itself and will be considered here
only in so far as a stand has been taken on it in regard to the
doctrine of ultra vires. There are surprisingly few cases either in
the Supreme Court or in the lower federal courts in which the
178 Nat. Bank v. Missouri, 263 U. S. 640, 660, 44 S. Ct. 213 (1924).
179 105 U. S. 166, 173-174, 26 L. Ed. 1015 (1881).
1so 7 "rmomm, Cyc. op CoRP. §§ 3448 and 3451.
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question has been discussed. As a matter of general practice it
would seem that all parties concerned have taken it for granted
that the federal courts would apply their own rule without regard
to the contrary state rules. Otherwise it would be impossible to
account for the small number of cases in which the question has
been raised or for the great difference in the way in which the
doctrine of ultra vires has developed in the federal courts and in
the state courts as applied to corporations chartered by the states.
Of course, the federal doctrine is to be followed when the corpora-
tion is one organized under an Act of Congress. 8 1
It is stated in FLETCHER ON CORPORATIONS 18 2 that the Supreme
Court seems never to have decided whether it is bound to follow
the state rule. And while the matter has been discussed in a few
cases, it is indeed difficult to say just'what the Court's position is,
for even those few decisions are by no means consistent.
In considering this matter it should be borne in mind that
there are two distinct problems, one of minor importance concern-
ing the duty to follow state decisions on the question whether the
transaction was ultra vires or not, and the other of prime import-
ance concerning the duty to follow state decisions on the question
of the legal effect of an ultra vires transaction.
Before taking up these questions it may be well to distinguish
two other groups of cases in which the problem though somewhat
similar is quite distinct. On the one band, there are cases in which
the highest court of a state has passed on the question of the effect
of an ultra vires transaction by a corporation formed in the state.
In these cases it is clear that the decision of the state court in the
particular case is binding on the Supreme Court both as to whether
the transaction was ultra vires and as to the effect of the trans-
action if ultra vires, the decision on these points raising no federal
question. 1 ' On the other hand, there are cases originating in the
courts of another state in which the question on appeal to the
Supreme Court is whether full faith and credit has been given
to the laws of the state where the corporation was organized. In
these cases the decisions of the state which chartered the corpora-
tion are to be given effect both as to whether the transaction was
authorized and as to the effect of unauthorized action, provided
181 Coon v. Smith, 4 F. Supp. 960 (1933).
182 7 FLETCHER, Cyc. op CoRP. § 3482.
183 Cornell Univ. v. Fiske, 136 U. S. 152, 174, 10 S. Ct. 775 (1890); Fifth
Ave. Coach Co. v. N. Y., 221 U. S. 467, 481-482, 31 S. Ct. 709 (1911).
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of course they have been proved as matters of fact in the trial
court.1 14
The cases under immediate discussion are those which origi-
nated in or were removed to a federal court and which raise the
question of the extent to which the federal court is bound to-apply
state law when dealing with a corporation formed in that state.
On the first problem as to whether the transaction was ultra vires,
there seems to be no doubt that the federal court is under a duty
to follow any authoritative decisions of the state courts construing
.either a statute of the state or the charters of corporations formed
under the statute.1'8  But when this point is passed and the ques-
tion arises as to the effect of an ultra vkes transaction, it is un-
safe to generalize. About all that can be done is to point out the
inconsistent positions which have been taken by the federal courts
on this question.
Consider first the Supreme Court decisions. In Sioux City
Terminal Co. v. Trust Go.' e6 the question was the validity of a
mortgage given to secure an issue of bonds. The corporation claim-
ed that the mortgage was void because the debt secured by it was
in excess of a statutory debt limit. The Supreme Court upheld
the mortgage saying that it was bound by decisions of the state
court that such contracts were enforceable. In Williams V. Gay-
lord'ST the Court held a similar mortgage void, again saying that
it was bound by state decisions to that effect. So far this would
seem to be in line with the general rule that the construction and
effect of a state statute are to be determined by the law of the
state.
But with those cases compare Ward of Joslin8 which was
decided on the same day as the Gaylord case. In the Joslin case
the question as to the effect of an ultra vires transaction arose
in an unusual and interesting manner. In a previous suit in a state
court in Kansas the plaintiff had procured a default judgment
against a corporation on an ultra vires guaranty but he was able
184 Chicago R. R. Co. v. Ferry Co., 119 U. S. 615, 622-624, 7 S. Ct. 398
(1887); Bldg. & Loan Assn. v. Ebaugh, 185 U. S.114, 22 S. Ct. 566 (1902);
Bldg. & Loan Assn. v. Williamson, 189 U. S. 122, 23 S. Ct. 527 (1903).
1s Terminal Co. v. Tr. Co., 173 U. S. 99, 106-107, 19 S. Ct. 341 (1899);
Williams v. Gaylord, 186 U. S. 157, 167-168, 22 S. Ct. 798 (1902); Lewis v.
Nat. Bank, 274 Fed. 587, 595 (1921); Harker v. Ralston-Purina Co., 45 F.
(2d) 929 (1930).
's 173 U. S. 99, 19 S. Ct. 341 (1899).
187186 U. S. 157, 22 S. Ct. 798 (1902).
188 186 U. S. 142, 22 S. Ct. 807 (1902).
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to obtain only a partial satisfaction of that judgment. He then
brought suit in a federal court against the defendant, a stock-
holder, to enforce the defendant's secondary liability under the
statutes and Constitution of Kansas which provided that stock-
holders should be liable to the extent of the par value of their
stock for the debts of the corporation. The Supreme Court held
that the defendant could go behind the judgment in the prior suit
to show that it had been rendered on an ultra vires contract and
further to show that the liability of a corporation on ultra vires
transaction was not a debt of the corporation within the meaning
of the statutes and Constitution of Kansas as properly construed.
It was admitted that the rule in Kansas as to ultra vires
contracts was a liberal one, but because a case exactly like the one
in question had not been passed on, the Court purported to con-
clude that if the corporation had put in the defense of ultra vires,
the Kansas Court would have sustained it. But very properly
the Court was not satisfied with that line of reasoning, so it went
further and said:
"If, however, under the state decisions, the corporation would
be held estopped from denying the liability, it does not fol-
low that the stockholders must therefore be held liable, if the
obligation was in fact incurred without authority."18 9
Then on the assumption that "debts" as used in the Kansas
Constitution was so ambiguous a term as to justify the Court in
putting its own construction on it, there being no Kansas decision
on the point, the Court proceeded to read into the constitutional
provision the qualification that "debts" means only those obli-
gations incurred in an intra vires transaction. It would seem obvi-
ous that debts as here used can only mean such obligations as are
enforceable in the courts of this state. The fact that there were
no state decisions in which the question had been raised is fair
evidence that the term is void of ambiguity.
But even if the Court may have a technical justification for
its interpretation, the result is certainly out of harmony with the
admittedly liberal doctrine of the Kansas Court. The case can be
explained only on the assumption that even when the Supreme
Court purports to apply state law it will give effect to its own
doctrine whenever it disagrees strongly enough with the result
which would follow a logical application of the state rule. This is
1s Id. at 151.
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borne out by the emphasis which the Court placed on the fact
that one of the most important grounds of the doctrine of ultra
vires is the protection of stockholders. While this may be true of
the federal doctrine, it most assuredly was not true of the Kansas
rule which the Court was supposed to be applying.
Despite the decisions in the first two cases, when consider-
ation is taken of the attitude of the Court in the Joslin case and of
the many other cases in which the federal rule has been applied with-
out regard to the state decisions, it would be unsafe to say that
the Court has adopted any settled policy on the question of what
law is controlling. The decisions cannot be reconciled on the prin-
ciple that in some of them the question was the construction and
effect of a state statute in which case the Court is bound by the
state decisions, while in others it was one of general jurisprudence
in which case the Court is free to apply its own view. In all of
the cases the statute is merely read into and becomes a part of
the charter so that ultimately the question involved is the effect of
the violation of its charter by a corporation. And the fact that
there were often opposing state decisions construing an applicable
statute in those cases where the Court applied its own rule is hard
to reconcile with the Court's statement that it will take judicial
notice of those decisions. 90
The confusion on this subject is very naturally carried over
into the decisions of the lower federal courts. For instance, in
Lumber Co. v. Goldman,'91 where state decisions on the effect of
an ultra vires contract were followed, it was said:
"The rule that one who has received the benefit of a contract
which is simply ultra vires and not contrary to good morals
may not plead the defense of ultra vires is fully sustained by
the decisions of the Supreme Court of Arkansas, of which
state the Lumber Company was a corporation ..... The law
in this respect as announced by the Supreme Court of
Arkansas is to be followed by us."
On the other hand, however, consider Lewis v. National Bank,'92
where although it was admitted that the federal court was bound
by a state decision that a contract was ultra vires, it was said:
"so R. R. Co. v. Ferry Co., 119 U. S. 615, 622, 7 S. Ct. 398 (1887).
'91247 Fed. 423, 428 (1917), cert. denied 246 U. S. 663, 38 S. Ct. 333
(1918). Accord, Land Co. v. Lombard, 132 Fed. 721, 741 (1904); Hummel
v. Warren Co., 5 P. (2d) 451, 453 (1925).
12274 Fed. 587, 595 (1921).
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"The rights and remedies of the parties to this ultra vires
contract are questions of general jurisprudence, and therefore
the decision in that respect is not controlling, but must be
decided by this court upon the facts in this case."
In view of this evident lack of any settled federal court policy in
regard to the matter of following state law, little hope for an early
escape from the ultra vires doctrine of the Supreme Court is evi-
dent along this line.
It is undoubtedly true that as a general proposition it is de-
sirable for the federal courts to be free to apply their own rules
on matters of general jurisprudence without regard to the
anomalies of the local law, for in this way the cause of uniformity
is furthered. However, when the federal rule is the decided
minority view, this matter of uniformity really becomes an argu-
ment for imposing on the federal courts a duty to follow state
law, or at least an argument for a change in the federal rule.
VII. RECENT DEvELoPMENTs
A. Lower Federal Court Decisions
There have been very few Supreme Court cases dealing with
ultra vires transactions since the passage of the Judiciary Act of
March 3, 1911,19" which made final the judgment of the Circuit
Court of Apieals in most of those cases in which the problem
would normally arise, leaving an appeal to the Supreme Court open
only by means of a writ of certiorari, the granting of which is
discretionary. In view of this fact an examination was made of
the decisions of the lower federal courts in order to determine the
extent to which the Supreme Court doctrine has been followed or
modified. This examination was largely limited to cases involving
ultra vires contracts, for it is in this field that the Supreme Court
rule is most out of accord with the rule in the majority of state
courts. A review of only a few of these decisions will suffice to
show that by and large little advance, if any, has been made be-
yond the Supreme Court position.
Many of the cases state and apply the strict doctrine that no
recovery can be had on the contract under any circumstances, re-
covery being limited to quasi-contracts. For example, in Texas and
193 §§ 128, 239, 240 and 251.
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Par. Ry. Co. v. Pottorff'- it was held that a national bank was not
bound by its ultra vires contract to secure a private deposit and
that it was entitled to liberty bonds pledged with its trust officer
for that purpose, the depositor being left to his claim with other
general creditors. And again in Coon v. Smit70L' a contract by a
national bank to repurchase securities at the selling price, which
was above the market price, was held void but recovery of exactly
the same amount as would have been due on the contract was
allowed on a count for money had and received. Although both
these cases involve a national bank, the court does not emphasize
this fact but discusses the matter generally and states its doctrine
so broadly as to apply to state corporations as well. And the same
strict doctrine is stated in cases involving state corporations. For
instance, in Gibso* v. Kansas City Refining Co.19 6 although the
case was brought within the exception as to the abuse of authority,
the court lays down the strict view.
On the other hand, there are quite a few cases allowing re-
covery on the contract itself when the corporation has received
the benefit of the contract. For example, in Kellogg-Mackay Co.
v. Havre Hotel Co.1 97 the corporation was held liable on an ultra
vires guaranty, having received the benefit of the goods furnished
inder it. But if it be assumed that the benefit conferred is equal
to the contract price, there is no advance over the position taken
by the Supreme Court in the Mott Iran Works case. And that
the rule as thus applied in some of the lower federal courts is
,really based on principles of quasi-contracts is borne out by the
1)4 63 F. (2d) 1 (1933), aff' d 291 U. S. 245, 54 S. Ct. 416 (1934). Accord,
City of Marion, Ill. v. Sneeden, 291 U. S. 262, 54 S. Ct. 421 (1934) (com-
panion case). The same rule was followed by the District Court of the North-
ern District of West Virginia in Harrell v. Lawhead, 13 F. Supp. 298.
1-54 F. Supp. 960 (1933). But see Awotin v. Atlas Exchange Nat. Bank
of Chicago, 295 U. S. 209, 55 S. Ct. 674 (1935), discussed su pra p. 308, where
the Supreme Court held such a transaction wholly void, giving rise neither
to a right on the contract nor to a right of quasi-contractual recovery.
1o6 32 F. (2d) 658, 663-661 (1929). For less recent cases see, In re John
B. Rose Co., 275 Fed. 416 (1921); Bassick v. Aetna Explosives Co., 246 Fed.
974, 1004 (1917). And of. Sherman & Ellis v. Casualty Co., 41 F. (2d) 588
(1930), cert. denied 282 U. S. 893, 51 S. Ct. 107 (1930) (contract also void
as against public policy).
197 199 Fed. 727, 733-734 (1912). See also Mining Co. v. Anderson, 245
Fed. 67 (1917); Refining Co. v. Nat. Bank, 280 Fed. 879 (1922), aff'd 284
Fed. 718, with which of. In re Kentucky Mfg. Co., 3 F. Supp. 958, 964 (1932);
French v. Long, 42 F. (2d) 45, 47 (1930).
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decision in In re Steele Furniture Co.19 8 There the Court said
that the corporation would be estopped to plead ultra vires when
sued on the contract if the benefit of the performance went to it,
but the defense was allowed because no benefit was received.
In view of these cases which are a fair cross section of the
lower federal court decisions since 1911, it would be unsafe to say
that there has been much further liberalization of the accepted
federal doctrine. While the court failed to mention it, probably
some of these more liberal decisions may be explained on the
ground that the court was merely applying the state rule to a
state corporation. But aside from that, since emphasis was placed
on the benefit received under the contract, there is little differ-
ence between this result and allowing receovery only in quasi-
contracts. At most, all that can be said is that a few of the lower
federal courts have gone so far as to give the plaintiff the benefit
of his bargain when the contract has been performed on one side.
B. Statutory Modifications of the Ultra Vires Doctrine
As long ago as 1898 it was prophesied "that we shall never
see our commercial law in a satisfactory state until the courts re-
establish the common law doctrine of general capacities, treating
contracts made beyond the limits of the charter activity as con-
tracts prohibited but not void and leaving the state to punish the
disregard of the prohibition while enforcing the contract between
the parties."1 99
While there has been some movement in this direction, the
prophecy has on the whole come true. As has been seen, only one
state has gone so far as to allow recovery on, a purely executory
contract, most of the states having been content with the allowance
of recovery on a contract executed on one side. The uncertainty
as to when recovery was to be allowed and the lack of agreement
as to the ground on which recovery was to be placed have resulted
in confusion on the whole subject generally and also in confusion
in the decisions of a single court, as witness the state of affairs
in the Supreme Court cases.200 The courts having failed to remedy
this confusing situation, as was sooner or later to have been ex-
198 18 F. (2d) 490, 491 (1927), cert. denied 274 U. S. 758, 47 S. Ct. 768
(1927).
199 Pepper, Unauthorized Corporate Contracts (1898) 8 YALE L. T. 24, 31.
200 And of. Stevens, Ultra Vires Transactions under the New Ohio General
Corporation Act (1930) 4 U. oF Cir. L. REv. 419, where a similar con-
fusion in the previous Ohio decisions is pointed out.
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peeted the legislatures have recently begun to take a hand in the
matter with the avowed purpose of "obviating a disgraceful legal
situation which had no basis in history, came into the law by mis-
take, and remained to plague businessmen and lawyers for nearly
a hundred years." 101
Following the example of Vermont 0 2 which has had legis-
lation on the subject since 1915, the legislatures of ten other states
- Ohio 203 in 1927, Louisiana 204 in 1928, California,20 5 Idaho20 6 and
Indiana 2 7 in 1929, lichigan 20 8 in 1931, Illinois, 20 Minnesota,210
Pennsylvania,21' and Washington 212 in 1933, - have passed statutes
either entirely abolishing or drastically limiting the doctrine of
ultra vires in so far as the parties to the transaction are concerned.
Without entering upon a detailed consideration of these various
statutes, a field which has recently been more than adequately
covered2 13 and one which is somewhat foreign to a consideration
of the Supreme Court decisions, two points may profitably be
made in connection with this newly awakened legislative interest
in the subject.
In the first place, this recent legislative activity is proof of
the fact that the problem of ultra vires is by no means a dead issue
and that the present unsatisfactory state of the law has resulted in
a growing demand for change. It would seem that the persistent
refusal of the Supreme Court in the past twenty-five years to take
under review more than a few cases involving ultra vires trans-
actions, and this presumably on the ground that the matter was not
of sufficient importance to warrant the granting of a writ of
certiorari, is but another way of saying that in the opinion of the
Court its doctrine as formulated in the last century is a satis-
factory solution of the problem. However, when in contrast to this
201 Report of Special Committee on Revision of Ohio Corporation Law
(1926) 59.
202 VT. GEn. LAws (1917) §§ 4919, 4923; Vt. Laws 1915, No. 141, § 15.203 OHio GEN. CODE (Page, Supp. 1931) §§ 8623-8, 8623-9.204 La. Laws 1928, No. 250, § 12.
200 CAL. Civ. CODE (Deering, 1923) § 355 as amended by Cal. Laws 1929,
c. 711, § 25.
200 Idaho Laws 1929, c. 262, § 10.
207 Ind. Acts 1929, c. 215, § 3.
208 Mich. Pub. Acts 1931, No. 327, § 11.
209 ILL. REv. STAT. (Smith-Hurd, 1935) c. 32, § 157-8.
210 3 M Ix. STAT. (Mason, Supp. 1934) § 7492-11.
211 PA. STAT. ANx. (Purdon, Supp. 1935) tit. 15, §§ 2852-301 and 303.
212 WASH. CODE (Pierce, Supp. 1935) § 4592-41.
213 See Note (1930) 44 HARv. L. REv. 280 and other articles there cited;
7 FL TCHE, CYc. or Cop. §§ 3439-3443.
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complacent attitude of the Supreme Court one notes the dissatis-
faction of businessmen and laymen generally with even the liberal
state rules, which dissatisfaction has already assumed sufficient
proportions to compel legislative action in seven states, it becomes
fairly evident that this subject is one of enough importance to re-
quire the Supreme Court to reconsider its present doctrine and so
modify it as to bring it into accord with the demands of present
conditions and so into accord with the demands of justice.
And in the second place, it is at least open to question whether
the problem can be better solved by legislation than by the courts
in their lawmaking capacity. In a recent note in the HARvARD LAW
RE vEw214 it was pointed out that the Uniform Business Corpora-
tion Act, the provisions of which in regard to ultra Vires were
substantially adopted in several states is so general in its dis-
tinction between capacity and authority, in its conferring upon
corporations the capacity of natural persons and in its abolition of
the doctrine of constructive notice of the limitations on the author-
ity of the corporation, that the Act can have the desired effect only
if given a liberal and sympathetic interpretation by the courts.
On the other hand, it was suggested that, the statutes which go
further and with certain exceptions in favor of the state and non-
assenting stockholders specifically abolish the doctrine as in Cali-
fornia, or abolish it except in the case of actual notice of the lack
of-authority as in Ohio, are subject to the danger of omission
inherent -in all codification and are also open to the possible ob-
jection that the attempt to spell out exactly the consequences of
unauthorized action will result in too rigid a scheme.
Whether these objections are more than theoretical, it is too
early to. say but it does seem that a problem which involves the
conflicting interests of the state, the corporation, its creditors, its
siockholders and third parties is one which naturally lends itself
more readily to judicial than to legislative treatment. And- it is
certainly true that the success or failure of these statutes in re-
moving the existent inconsistency and injustice will ultimately de-
pend upon the attitude of the courts in applying them.
This being so, the courts should and may with credit to them-
selves proceed to make over their rules on-this subject. There can
be no valid objection to such action on their part. Indeed, it would
be a serious indictment of the law should the courts admit their
214 (1930) 44 HARV. L. REv. 280.
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inability to remove the objectionable features of this doctrine which
under present conditions is so unsuited to a just treatment of the
problem. However, if the courts should continue their refusal to
correct this unfortunate situation, there is at least in the case of
the state courts a reasonably good prospect that the legislatures
will soon take the matter in hand. But little hope can be seen
along this line in respect to the Supreme Court doctrine for there
are comparatively so few federal corporations that an attempt by
Congress to remedy the situation could at best be but a partial
success. It necessarily follows, then, that in the light of the grow-
ing demand for change the Supreme Court will in the future be
open to even more serious criticism than in the past if it persists
in its refusal to reconsider its outworn and unjust doctrine.
VIII. CONCLUSION
It has been seen that almost from the beginning two con-
ceptions of the nature of a corporation have been in constant com-
petition as starting points for judicial reasoning on the subject of
ultra vires corporate action. Although the conception at first
adopted was the one formulated in the Fiction Theory with the
result that corporations were held responsible for no unauthorized
action whatever, almost at once there became apparent a definite
and sustained trend toward the adoption of that conception which
is embodied in the Realist Theory. And while for a time this con-
stant advance toward the Realist Theory was to be seen in the
Supreme Court decisions, in recent years this progress has unfor-
tunately come to an end.
The first swing away from the Fiction Theory was in those
cases holding the corporation liable for crimes and torts, the Court
realizing that in no other way could protection be given to the
social interest in the general security and to individual interests
of personality and substance. There soon followed a line of cases
holding ultra vires acquisitions of property valid, this result being
dictated by the necessity for the protection of the social interest in
the security of acquisitions. And although the Supreme Court has
refused to give validity to ultra vires contracts as such, there
again under pressure of the interest in the security of business
transactions it has been compelled to give effect to them indirectly
either under cover of the exception as to an abuse of authority or
by allowing recovery in quasi-contracts.
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This was all very well so far as it went but when one considers
the immature stage at which this progress was arrested, the out-
look is anything but promising. From whatever point of view the
matter is approached, there seems to be no justification for the
present position of the Supreme Court.
Its doctrine falls far short of the ideal of a body of logically
interdependent precepts. Such logical consistency can be attained
only by the execlusive application of either the Fiction Theory or
the Realist Theory and is certainly not to be hoped for when the
Court applies now one, now the other. It is apparent that the
Supreme Court has failed to keep pace with the majority of Ameri-
can courts in the progressive development of the idea of corporate
liability for all unauthorized action. It is also clear that the doc-
trine is inadequate to even a theoretically just and equitable solu-
tion of the problem.
When in dealing with ultra vires contracts the Court at-
tempted a logical development of the Fiction Theory, it laid itself
liable to all the criticism which can be directed against the
mechanical application of legal rules. In singling out for pro-
tection the interests of non-assenting stockholders and the interest
of the state that corporations keep within their authority, the Court
caused an untold and unnecessary waste of other interests which
should normally be protected by the policy in favor of the security
of transactions. But still more serious has been the Court's failure
to reconsider its doctrine in the light of present conditions and
thus to take account of the growing and insistent demand for a
more practical solution. It is only natural that a doctrine formu-
lated under conditions which existed a century or more ago when
corporations were comparatively few and unimportant should be
impracticable under present conditions when the bulk of business
activity is carried on by means of the corporate device. It becomes
a serious matter indeed when the courts fail to realize and to
guard against the results of this necessary obsolescence of legal
doctrines.
As was said before, no entirely satisfactory and just solution
of this problem of ultra vires may be expected from the Supreme
Court until it so modifies its present doctrine as to make unauthor-
ized corporate action subject only to direct attack by the state
unless the case is one involving some paramount interest which can
be adequately secured only by holding the transaction void or
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unless special circumstances are present which negative the exis-
tence of the social interest in the security of transactions. It is to
be hoped that the Supreme Court will no longer stand out against
a view which is demanded alike by logical analysis, by historical
development, by considerations of right and justice, and above all
by the ever pressing necessity that traditional legal materials must
be constantly reshaped in the light of existent conditions if they are
to be made subservient to the needs of the present.
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